UCMJ Article 106: Impersonation of Officer, Noncommissioned or Petty Officer, or Agent or Official

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Rank in the armed forces is a claim on obedience. When a sergeant gives an order or an officer demands access to a secure area, the system works because the rank is real and others can rely on it. Impersonation attacks that reliance at its source. By assuming an identity he has not earned, the impersonator borrows authority that does not belong to him and turns the trust the system depends on into a tool for deception. Article 106 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice exists to punish that conduct, from the soldier who pins on rank he does not hold to the elaborate fraud that uses a false badge to extract money or compliance.

Article 106 is codified at 10 U.S.C. 906. Its current form is a product of the Military Justice Act of 2016, effective 1 January 2019. That rewrite reassigned the section number: the offense formerly at Article 106 was spies, which moved to Article 103, and the impersonation offense took its place at 106. A description that still treats Article 106 as the espionage article reflects the pre-2019 numbering and is no longer correct.

How the statute is structured

Article 106 defines three offenses, set out in three subsections.

Subsection (a) is simple impersonation. It punishes any person who wrongfully and willfully impersonates an officer, a noncommissioned officer, or a petty officer; an agent of superior authority of one of the armed forces; or an official of a government. No intent to gain anything is required. The wrongful and willful assumption of the false identity completes the offense.

Subsection (b) is impersonation with intent to defraud. It covers the same impersonations as subsection (a), but committed with the added purpose of defrauding, that is, of obtaining money, property, or some other benefit through the deception. The intent to defraud is what separates this graver offense from the others.

Subsection (c) is impersonation of a government official without intent to defraud but with the exercise of authority. It punishes one who wrongfully and willfully, and without intent to defraud, impersonates an official of a government by committing an act that exercises or asserts the authority of the office the person claims to have. Here there is no fraudulent purpose, but there is something more than the bare false claim of subsection (a): the impersonator must actually do something an official would do, such as conduct a search, demand identification, or issue a directive in the claimed capacity.

What the government must prove

For simple impersonation under subsection (a), the prosecution must prove that the accused impersonated one of the persons the statute lists, and that the impersonation was wrongful and willful. Willfulness means the accused knew the identity was false and assumed it deliberately. A service member mistakenly addressed by a higher rank who fails to correct the error has not willfully impersonated anyone. Wrongfulness excludes conduct that is authorized or otherwise justified, which is why a training exercise, a sanctioned undercover operation, or a theatrical performance is not an offense even when it involves assuming a false rank or identity.

For impersonation with intent to defraud under subsection (b), the government must prove the same impersonation and willfulness, and additionally that the accused acted with intent to defraud. The fraud need not have succeeded; the intent at the time of the impersonation is the element.

For impersonation of a government official under subsection (c), the government must prove the willful and wrongful impersonation of a government official and the further fact that the accused committed an act that exercised or asserted the authority of the claimed office. A bare claim to be a federal agent, without any act in the assumed capacity, does not satisfy this subsection; the accused must have acted on the false authority.

A line runs through all three offenses: impersonation requires affirmative steps to assume an identity or authority, not a passing or ambiguous reference to rank. Wearing the insignia of a higher grade, presenting a falsified identification, or introducing oneself in a false official capacity to gain access can amount to impersonation; an offhand boast that no one could reasonably take seriously may lack the willfulness the offense requires.

Maximum punishment

The maximums turn on which offense is charged, and the gap between them is wide.

Simple impersonation without intent to defraud, whether charged under subsection (a) or as the exercise-of-authority offense under subsection (c), authorizes a bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, confinement for six months, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. Impersonation with intent to defraud under subsection (b) authorizes a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, confinement for three years, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The far heavier ceiling for the fraud offense reflects the law’s view that impersonation for gain, which exploits the trust rank commands to take something of value, is more harmful than impersonation alone.

For offenses committed on or after 27 December 2023, the military judge imposes the sentence within the statutory sentencing parameters. The 2024 Manual assigns simple impersonation to the lower sentencing category and impersonation with intent to defraud to a higher one, so that the offense date and the applicable parameter, not merely the statutory ceiling, govern the sentence a judge may impose.

Defenses

The defenses track the elements. A claim of no willfulness, that the false identity was the product of accident, miscommunication, or a genuine misunderstanding about one’s own rank or appointment, defeats every variant of the offense, because each requires a willful impersonation. A claim of authorization defeats the wrongfulness element: a service member acting under proper authority in an undercover capacity, an authorized training scenario, or an official investigation has not wrongfully impersonated anyone, provided the authority existed before the conduct and the accused stayed within its scope. For a subsection (b) charge, the absence of intent to defraud reduces the conduct, at most, to a simple impersonation. For a subsection (c) charge, the absence of any act exercising or asserting the claimed authority means the offense is not made out, because that act is what distinguishes the subsection from a bare false claim.

Article 106 sits beside several neighboring offenses, and the choice among them turns on what the accused did beyond claiming a false status. Wearing an unauthorized insignia, decoration, badge, ribbon, device, or lapel button is a separate offense under Article 106a, and a service member who merely wears rank or a decoration he has not earned, without acting on the claimed authority, may fit that article more comfortably than the impersonation statute; one who exercises authority based on the false rank fits Article 106. Where a false military identity is used to obtain money or property, the fraud articles may apply alongside impersonation. And impersonation that disrupts good order and discipline can draw a charge under the general article, Article 134, in addition to Article 106.

Conduct that claims false military honors for civilians is governed by separate federal law rather than by Article 106. The Stolen Valor Act of 2013, codified at 18 U.S.C. 704, makes it a federal crime to fraudulently claim to have received certain military decorations or medals with intent to obtain money, property, or another tangible benefit, and it is prosecuted in the civilian federal courts. The same course of conduct by a service member can implicate both the federal statute and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Sources

  • 10 U.S.C. 906, Article 106, Impersonation of officer, noncommissioned or petty officer, or agent or official: https://law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/906
  • 10 U.S.C. 906a, Article 106a, Wearing unauthorized insignia, decoration, badge, ribbon, device, or lapel button: https://law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/906a
  • Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024 ed.), Part IV (Punitive Articles), Article 106: https://jsc.defense.gov

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It describes military law and procedure of public record, does not address any individual case, and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

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