UCMJ Article 131b: Obstructing Justice

Obstructing justice is the military offense of interfering with a criminal or disciplinary case in order to influence, impede, or otherwise derail its outcome. In the current Uniform Code of Military Justice it is a freestanding punitive article, codified at 10 U.S.C. 931b. That placement is recent. Before the Military Justice Act of 2016 took effect on 1 January 2019, obstruction had no article of its own and was prosecuted as an enumerated offense under Article 134, the general article. The 2019 reorganization moved it, along with perjury, subornation of perjury, misprision, and several related interference offenses, out of Article 134 and into the new Article 131 series. References to “Article 134 obstruction of justice” describe the pre-2019 framework and are no longer the correct citation for conduct charged today.

What changed in the move to Article 131b

The relocation was not merely cosmetic. As an Article 134 offense, obstruction carried a terminal element: the government had to prove not only the obstructive act and intent but also that the conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. Article 131b drops that requirement. The current offense is defined entirely by the obstructive act, the existence or foreseeability of proceedings, and the intent to interfere, which streamlines what the prosecution must establish and removes the general-article overlay.

Elements of the current offense

Under Article 131b the government must prove two core elements beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the accused wrongfully did a certain act in the case of a particular person against whom the accused had reason to believe there were, or would be, criminal or disciplinary proceedings pending. Second, that the act was done with the intent to influence, impede, or otherwise obstruct the due administration of justice. The statutory text frames the offense around conduct undertaken “with intent to influence, impede, or otherwise obstruct the due administration of justice.”

Two features of these elements do most of the work. The proceedings need not already be underway. It is enough that the accused had reason to believe they were pending or would be initiated, which reaches conduct aimed at heading off a foreseeable investigation, not only conduct aimed at one already opened. And the offense is one of specific intent. An act that happens to make an investigation harder is not enough; the government must prove the accused acted for the purpose of interfering with it.

What conduct qualifies

Obstruction covers a wide range of acts that share the common feature of an intent to interfere with the administration of justice. Military case law has treated the following as qualifying conduct: preventing a person from communicating with authorities through intimidation, force, or threats, such as taking a victim’s phone to stop a call to police; destroying or concealing evidence when proceedings are reasonably foreseeable, such as removing a recording before investigators can secure it; wrongfully attempting to influence a witness, including repeatedly contacting a witness to discourage cooperation; and advising another person to invoke legal rights when that advice is given with a corrupt motive rather than honestly and disinterestedly.

That last category marks the boundary between lawful and unlawful conduct. Invoking the right to remain silent, declining to consent to a search, and consulting counsel are protected acts that cannot themselves constitute obstruction. Encouraging another person to exercise those same rights becomes wrongful only when it is done with a sinister purpose, for example to shield the accused or a confederate from discovery rather than out of genuine concern for the other person. Courts look to context, including tone, manner, frequency, and the accused’s own stake in the underlying matter, to separate honest advice from interference.

Maximum punishment

The Manual for Courts-Martial, Part IV, sets the maximum punishment for obstructing justice at a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for five years. As with any offense, the maximum is a ceiling rather than an expected sentence; the adjudged punishment turns on the facts, the nature and effect of the obstructive act, and any matters in aggravation or mitigation.

Sentencing for obstruction is also affected by the broader 2023 reforms. For offenses committed on or after 27 December 2023, a military judge imposes the sentence under the segmented-sentencing scheme and the Military Sentencing Parameters, rather than the panel members, even in a contested members trial. The statutory maximum from the Manual remains the outer limit, but the specific confinement parameter assigned to the offense should be confirmed against the current Manual for Courts-Martial, because the parameters restructured several maxima for conduct on or after that date.

How obstruction relates to neighboring offenses

Obstruction frequently overlaps with other offenses that protect the integrity of the justice system, and the same course of conduct can support more than one charge. Lying to investigators may be charged as both obstruction and a false official statement under Article 107. False testimony under oath may support both obstruction and perjury under Article 131. Within the Article 131 series, several related interference offenses now sit alongside 131b, including subornation of perjury (131a), misprision of a serious offense (131c), wrongful refusal to testify (131d), prevention of authorized seizure of property (131e), noncompliance with procedural rules (131f), and wrongful interference with an adverse administrative proceeding (131g). The choice among them depends on the precise act and the type of proceeding involved.

Obstruction commonly accompanies the very offense the accused sought to conceal. Because the two are distinct, a service member can be tried for both the underlying offense and the obstruction, and evidence of an attempt to suppress an investigation may also bear on the underlying case as evidence of consciousness of guilt.

Defenses and the lawful-conduct line

The most consequential defense follows directly from the intent element. Where the government cannot prove that the accused acted for the purpose of influencing or impeding proceedings, the offense fails. Conduct that is merely careless, or that incidentally complicates an inquiry without that purpose, does not meet the standard. The exercise of one’s own legal rights is not obstruction, and neither is privileged communication with defense counsel, although using the attorney-client relationship to further a crime, such as enlisting counsel in destroying evidence, falls outside the privilege. The absence of any actual or reasonably foreseeable proceeding can also negate an element, because the offense is tied to a case the accused had reason to believe was pending or forthcoming.

Sources

• 10 U.S.C. 931b (Article 131b, Obstructing justice), Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/931b
• 10 U.S.C. 931b, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United States Code: https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section931b
• Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024 edition), Part IV, Joint Service Committee on Military Justice: https://jsc.defense.gov/Military-Law/Current-Publications-and-Updates/
• United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Core Criminal Law Subjects digest, Obstructing Justice: https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/digest/IIIA96.htm

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It describes military law and procedure of public record, does not address any individual case, and does not create an attorney-client relationship.